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Federal Statutory Restrictions on the
Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses
INTRODUCTION

A woman walks into a ticketing agency in Los Angeles and
purchases a cruise ticket. The ticket instructs her to carefully examine
the printed material on the last page of the ticket. On the last page
there is something called a forum selection clause. The woman slips on
a wet walkway during the cruise and seeks recovery of her medical
expenses from the cruise line. The woman is surprised to find out from
a lawyer that the only place she can maintain suit for her injury is
Florida. Since the amount of her damages is small, the woman declines
to pursue her claim because the increased cost of litigating in a distant
forum would swallow her recovery. This is the result despite the fact
that a federal statute precludes carriers from limiting their liability.
This article examines the relationship between forum selection clauses
and particular federal statutes.
I.

HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD FORUM SELECTION
CLAUSES AND THE CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL STATUTES

Forum selection clauses' are a means by which businesses can
remove uncertainties by preselecting a location for potential litigation.
Traditionally, however, courts held that these contractual devices were
invalid for two reasons. First, courts reasoned that the private contractual agreements violate public policy because they "oust" courts of
jurisdiction. 2 Second, in a small number of cases, forum selection
clauses were found to violate the applicable venue statutes of the state.'
1. A forum selection clause is "[a] clause in a contract preselecting a particular
forum, such as a given state, country, court or administrative proceeding, for the

resolution of a dispute." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).

2. See, e.g., Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82

F. 508 (6th Cir. 1897); Blair v. National Shirt & Overalls Co., 137 Il1. App. 413
(1907); Detwiler v. Lowden, 269 N.W. 367 (Minn. 1936). The ouster theory was the

same reasoning given for not enforcing other contractual provisions such as governing
law clauses and arbitration clauses. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,

510-11 (1974); Michael Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 139.
3. See, e.g., Matt v. Iowa Mutual Aid Ass'n., 46 N.W. 857 (Iowa 1890);
Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 109 S.E. 362 (N.C. 1921); Smith v. Watson, 44
S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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The Supreme Court rejected this traditional analysis of forum
selection clauses in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 4 The Bremen
Court, sitting in admiralty,5 disregarded the concept of ousting jurisdiction as a "vestigial legal fiction." 6 Under The Bremen, a court
would decline to entertain jurisdiction when there was a valid forum
selection clause. A forum selection clause was valid when it was
"reasonable." ' 7 Under the reasonableness standard a forum selection
clause is to be enforced unless the product of fraud, or overreaching,
or where the clause violates a strong policy of the forum state,8 or
provides for a seriously inconvenient forum. 9 The Bremen justified the
acceptance of forum selection clauses on the basis of modern commercial realities and the needs of business to remove uncertainties by
providing neutral forums.' 0
The Bremen has profoundly affected judicial attitudes concerning
forum selection clauses. While born in federal admiralty jurisdiction,
The Bremen reasonableness standard for the enforceability of forum
selection clauses quickly became generally applicable outside admir-

4. 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). The Supreme Court enforced a forum selection
clause between an American company, Zapata, and a German company, Unterweser.
The forum selection clause was contained in an agreement for cross oceanic towage
of an oil rig. See generally Willis L. M. Reese, The Supreme Court Supports
Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum Clauses, 7 INT'L LAW. 530 (1973).
5. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1333 (1948) grants original jurisdiction to federal courts,
exclusive of the state courts, in admiralty and maritime matters. Thus, at the time
of The Bremen, whether judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses would extend
outside admiralty was unclear. The district courts have accepted The Bremen holding
as applicable both outside admiralty and outside the specific factual circumstances
of international businesses providing for neutral forums. See infra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the expansion of The Bremen standard.

6. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
7. See id. at 10.
8. Id. at 15. (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (finding
a forum selection agreement invalid because it conflicted with the Federal Employers'
Liability Act)).
9. Id. at 17. The Court cites to Model Choice of Forum Act sec. 3(3) (1968)
for the proposition that where the contractual forum is seriously inconvenient, the
action could proceed in the non-contractual forum. The Model Act statement rests
on the assumption that allowing the action to proceed in the non-contractual forum
where the contractual forum is seriously inconvenient would be the intent of the
parties. Nevertheless, this seems to ignore that the increased cost of litigating in an
inconvenient forum may dissuade one party from maintaining a suit, thus contracting
for an inconvenient forum may be a method by one party to limit her prospective
liability.
10. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
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alty." The standard was applied outside the factual circumstances of
international businesses providing for foreign adjudication.1 2 The doc-

trine even became the most prevalent standard in state courts. 3

The growth of The Bremen standard favoring enforcement of

forum selection clauses resulted from a strong policy to provide certainty in business affairs.' 4 However, the Court in The Bremen recognized that even where a forum selection clause is not the product of

fraud or overreaching it is still not enforceable where it violates a
strong public policy. This public policy limitation on the enforceability
11. See, e.g., Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140,
1143 (W.D. Va. 1979)("Although [The] Bremen was an admiralty suit ... [the
reasonableness] test should be applicable to diversity suits because the same principles
on which it is based apply to interstate commercial activity .

. . .");

Public Water

Supply Dist. No. 1 v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071, 1072 (W.D. Mo.
1979)("[Tlhe [Bremen] principle is applicable to all forum-selection agreements .

").

12. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991)(enforcing
a boilerplate forum selection clause in passenger cruise ticket against individual);
Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1991)(enforcing forum
selection clause in franchise agreement); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Management Serv.
Co., 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1991) (enforcing forum selection clause in employment
contract specifying Saudi Arabia as exclusive forum). This expansion of the reasonableness test outside admiralty is supported by the reference made in The Bremen to

National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964)(holding that in

federal courts a party may consent jurisdiction through contractual designation of

an in state agent). See also Michael Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International
and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 148-49 (describing

the expansion of The Bremen standard outside admiralty). But cf., Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1987)(noting that while The Bremen "may
prove instructive" in deciding the effect of a forum selection clause in a motion to
transfer under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1404 (1948), The Bremen was an admiralty case)(emphasis
added).
13. See, e.g., Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979); Air Economy Corp. v. Aero-Flow Dynamics, Inc., 300 A.2d 856 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Central Contracting v. C.E. Youngdahl Co., 209 A.2d
310 (Pa. 1965); Green v. Clinic Masters, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 813 (S.D. 1978).
14. There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated private international agreement ...

should be given full effect .

. .

. It cannot be doubted

for a moment that the parties sought to provide for a neutral forum for the
resolution of any disputes arising during the tow. Manifestly, much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit
could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident might occur
or if jurisdiction were left to any place where The Bremen or Unterweser
might happen to be found. The elimination of all such uncertainties by
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable
element in international trade, commerce and contracting.
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972).
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of forum selection clauses is of importance because it serves to balance
the judicial policy favoring the enforcement of the clauses to serve
business interests against Congressional attempts to protect individuals.
Consequently, there is an inherent tension between the judicially adopted
policy favoring forum selection clauses and the public policy embodied
in Congressional legislation. This inherent tension between The Bremen
policy favoring enforcement of forum selection clauses and the underlying public policy of a particular statute is most pronounced where

Congress attempts to prevent parties without bargaining power from
contracting out of statutory protections. For example, statutes protecting employees,- or regulating common carriers, often contain provisions
attempting to prevent individuals from contracting away their rights.
These provisions reflect a stronger policy than typically inheres in a
Congressional statute. While these provisions are designed to address
the unequal bargaining positions of the parties, the dominant party can

continue to use the power of contract to obtain litigation advantages
that offset the statutory provisions. To what extent a party in a superior

bargaining position, like the cruise line in the introduction, with the

implied consent of the courts, may contractually modify the terms of
these protective statutes can be answered by an examination of the
public policy exception recognized in The Bremen.

This article examines the federal" statutory public policy restriction

to the general enforceability of forum selection clauses recognized in
15. A similar conflict can develop where there is a state statute and the case is
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., ECC Computer Ctr. v. Entre
Computer Ctr., 597 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. II1. 1984) (applying Bremen standard and
refusing to enforce a forum selection clause because it violated the protective policy
of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp.
905 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (applying Bremen standard and refusing to enforce forum
selection clause because to do so would violate policy of Wisconsin Fair Dealership
Law); Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, 482 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (refusing
to enforce both choice of law and forum selection clauses because of state's interest
in enforcing Wisconsin Franchise Investment Law). The conflict of state law and The
Bremen public policy exception to the enforceability of forum selection clauses in the
diversity context is complicated by the Erie doctrine. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 641 (1938). Courts and commentators have disagreed over the question of
whether state or federal law governs the enforcement of forum selection clauses. See
generally Robert A. de By, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for
Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068 (1989) (arguing federal law should not apply

to question of enforceability of forum selection clauses); Eric Fahlman, Forum
Selection Clauses: Should State or Federal Law Determine Validity in Diversity

Actions? 64 WASH. L. REV. 439 (1989) (arguing state law should control enforceability
of forum selection clause in diversity cases); Mathew Lampe, Forum Selection Clauses
Designating Foreign Courts: Does Federal or State Law Govern Enforceability in
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The Bremen.' 6 Part II consists of a specific analysis of Federal Employer's Liability Act. This statute was cited in The Bremen as an
example of a public policy rendering a forum selection clause unenforceable. Part III catalogues the use of this framework in the context

of other specific statutory situations. Part IV examines the possible
repercussions of recent Supreme Court interpretations of statutory
provisions with respect to forum selection clauses.

7

Part V compares

the approaches taken by courts concerning specific statutory provisions

and analyzes the apparent dismantling of the statutory public policy

model. Part VI concludes with a procedural model for balancing policy
considerations of particular statutes and the judicial policy favoring
enforcement of forum selection clauses.

II. TIE

FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT

FRAMEwoRK

The Bremen recognized forum selection clauses as prima-facie
valid in the absence of fraud, overreaching, or where providing for a
seriously inconvenient forum.'8 In addition, the Court noted an exception where enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum.' 9 The Bremen cited Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R., 20 a case
involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 2' as an example
of a statutory declaration of public policy rendering a forum selection
clause unenforceable. 22
Diversity Cases?A Question Left Open by Stewart Organization v. Ricoh, 22 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 307 (1989) (arguing that federal law applies where the contractual forum
is domestic, and state law should apply where the contractual forum is foreign). This
note examines only the conflict between The Bremen standard and federal statutes.
16. "A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy in the forum in which the suit
is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision." The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)(citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R., 338
U.S. 263 (1949), as an example).
17. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
18. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
19. Id. at 15.
20. 338 U.S. 263 (1949).
21. 45 U.S.C. secs. 51-56 (1988). See generally Case Comment, Federal Employers' Liability Act- Validity of Contracts Restricting Venue Thereunder, 25 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 413 (1950).
22. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (citing Boyd, 338 U.S. 263 (1949)). The
contract in Boyd was not a true forum selection clause because it was executed after
the cause of action arose. While courts prior to The Bremen found contracts that
limited venue to be void under the ouster theory and for public policy reasons, a
general exception to this rule was allowed where the contract was entered into after
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FELA is a remedial statute designed to modify the common law
negligence remedy rights for the benefit of railroad employees. 23 FELA
contained both a specific venue provision, 24 and a section prohibiting
exemptions from liability. 25 These provisions were designed to give
26
procedural advantages to railroad employees.
Prior to Boyd, there was a major split in opinion concerning the
meaning of "liability" as used in FELA, 27 and how it interacted with
the venue provision of section 56.28 Several court decisions grappled

the cause of action accrued. See Detwiler v. Lowden, 269 N.W. 838 (Minn. 1936).
The reason for the distinction was that once the cause of action accrued, the plaintiff
had the choice of forum, and exercised it by contract. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
174 F.2d 556, 561 (1948) (Swan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 560 (Hand, J.,
concurring)(arguing that there is no rational basis for the distinction).
23. See, e.g., Green v. River Terminal Ry., 763 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1985);
Sowards v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 580 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1978).
24. Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the
United States, in a district of the residence of the defendant, or in which
the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business
at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the
state courts of the several states.
45 U.S.C. sec. 56 (1988).
25. "Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent
of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability
created by this act, shall be void ....

"

45 U.S.C. sec. 55 (1988).

26. John C. Walker, Recent Decision, 48 MICH. L. REv. 527, 528 (1950)(noting
that the purpose of Congress in drafting FELA was to give every possible procedural
advantage to employees in dealing with common carriers); cf. Rodriguez v. Delray
Connecting R.R., 473 F.2d 819, 820 (6th Cir. 1973)(Congressional purpose was to
allow recovery even where common law negligence is not shown).
27. Compare, e.g., Grand Trunk W.R. v. Boyd, 33 N.W.2d 120, 123 (1948),
overruled, 338 U.S. 763 (1949)("If congress by using the word liability in sec. 55 had
intended to include venue, such intent could have been readily and clearly expressed.")
with Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 558 (2d Cir. 1949)("Had a restricted
meaning of liability been intended, it would surely have been simple, indeed, to limit
the statutory provision to the duty to pay damages."). Determining the definition of
statutory provisions prohibiting limitations of liability is a recurrent theme in determining the enforceability of forum selection clauses where there is an applicable
statute. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 1ll S. Ct. 1522 (1991)(holding that
statutory provision that voids liability limitations in passenger tickets does not
encompass forum selection clauses).
28. Since the venue provision of section 56 was an amendment added two years
after section 55, the "liability created in this act" could not have originally applied
to the specific venue provision. The venue provision was inserted "because the general
venue provisions worked injustices to employees." Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Kepner,
314 U.S. 44, 53 (1941). The use of contractual agreements to limit the wide venue
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with the character of the venue right that the statute granted, as well
as the effect of agreements to modify that right in light of the
prohibition against limitations in liability in section 55. Some courts
characterized the special venue provision as a waivable right and thus
allowed contractual waiver of the statute. 29 Other courts, however, held
the grant of venue to be a substantial right, the limitation of which
was a violation of the FELA statute.30
The Boyd decision resolved this ambiguity. Boyd involved an
action against a Michigan railroad brought by its former employee in
Illinois district court. The railroad attempted to enjoin the Illinois
proceeding based on a contract limiting venue entered into after the
injury.3" Boyd relied on Duncan v. Thompson 32 to interpret section 55
which prohibits the use of any "contract, rule, regulation, or device
whatsoever" to exempt any employer "from any liability created by
this [act]." ' 3 The Court in Duncan noted that the legislative history of
the section showed that Congress wished that it "have the full effect
that its comprehensive phraseology implies." ' 34 Boyd also interpreted
the grant of
the broad venue provision of section 56,35 characterizing
36
right."
"substantial
a
as
56
section
in
venue

statute was an attempt by employers to counteract the wide venue statute of FELA
that allowed employers to forum shop. This forum shopping allowed employers to
seek favorable forums to force employees to compromise suits rather than defend in
an inconvenient forum. Note, Courts-Venue-Attempts to Limit Venue Provisions of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 27 N.C. L. REv. 248, 248 (1949).
29. See, e.g., Roland v. Atchision, T. & S.F. Ry., 65 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ill.
1946); Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1945); Clark v. Lowden,
48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1942).
30. See, e.g., Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949);
Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co., 168 F.2d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 1948)(The court held
"that the inclusion of this section in the Employers' Liability Act, with its creation
of new obligations against the employer, makes the venue provision an inherent part
of the employer's liability. An attempt to limit it by contract is an attempt to exempt
the railroad from liability, and is void.").
31. See supra note 22.
32. 315 U.S. 1 (1941)(holding that post injury contract that required return of
money advanced before litigation was invalid under FELA section 55).
33. 45 U.S.C. sec. 55 (1988).
34. Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 6 (1941)(noting that congress contemplated the more restrictive language of the similar state statutes then in effect and
deliberately adopted the broader provisions of section 55).
35. The Court first interpreted the FELA venue provision in Baltimore & 0.
R.R v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941). In Kepner the Court held that a state court may
not exercise its equitable jurisdiction to prevent a resident from suing under FELA
in a federal forum in another state, where venue in that state was proper under the
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Based on this reasoning, the Boyd Court refused to enforce the
contractual limitation on venue as an impermissible restriction of a
substantial right conferred by the statute under section 55.37 Thus, the
Boyd decision rested on a statutory articulation of venue characterized
as a substantial right and a prohibition against any limitation of
liability. 3 These combined factors evidence a strong public policy of
protecting employees.39 The Bremen cited this framework as an example
of an articulation of a "strong public policy" rendering a forum
selection clause unenforceable. 40

III.

EXTENDING THE

FELA

FRAMEWORK TO OTHER STATUTES

The Boyd decision presents a framework for refusing to enforce
forum selection clauses where enforcement would violate statutory
policy. The wide venue provision characterized by the Boyd Court as
a substantial right together with the prohibition against any limitation
in liability combined to evidence a congressional policy to protect
employees. In order to prevent railroad companies from using their
bargaining power to contract away the employee's statutory protection,
the Court declined to enforce the clause. Other statutes contain similar
provisions as those found in FELA. The following section compares
the Boyd decision with other decisions where the judicial policy favoring
the enforcement of forum selection clauses conflicted with the underlying policy of congressional statutes. The comparison shows the
inconsistency of analysis under the seperate statutes where forum
selection clauses are concerned and highlights the need for a model to
balance competing policy concerns.

Act. While acknowledging that such venue may be inconvenient or vexatious the
Court noted that "[a] privilege of venue, granted by the legislative body which
created this right of action, cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience or
expense." Kepner, 314 U.S. at 54; see also Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S.
698 (1942)(holding a state may not enjoin a resident from prosecuting a FELA action
in another state court because of inconvenient venue where venue is proper under
the Act).
36. Boyd, 338 U.S. at 266.
37. Id.
38. Accord Sherman v. Pere Marquette Ry., 62 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Il1. 1945);
Pryor v. Union Pac. R.R., 214 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1950); Peterson v. Ogden Union Ry.
& Depot, 175 P.2d 744 (Utah 1946).
39. Boyd, 338 U.S. at 266 ("It would thwart the express purpose of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act to sanction defeat of that right by the device at bar.").
40. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
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THE JONES ACT

The Jones Act was enacted to provide seamen with the same
4
negligence protections held by railroad employees under FELA . The
Supreme Court has held that the entire judicially-developed doctrine of
42
law developed under FELA is applicable to Jones Act cases. This
makes the Jones Act unique compared to the other statutes to be
analyzed because the Boyd framework applies by the terms of the
statute instead of by analogy.
43
Like FELA, the Jones Act contains a specific venue provision.
This venue provision has also been interpreted to be a substantial
right." While the Jones Act does not expressly contain the FELA
provision prohibiting any limitation of liability, the incorporation of
FELA by reference should compel a similar decision.
Like FELA, the Jones Act is part of a public policy resting on the
belief that injured employees should have a right to recovery for
negligence superior to that provided under the common law. As yet,
no case law exists concerning the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in Jones Act cases. However, in order to preserve the statutory
protections Congress created, courts should strike down any limitation
of the Jones Act venue provision. While reasonable under The Bremen,
a forum selection clause is contrary to the policy underlying the statutes
and should not be given effect.
B.

THE SECURITIES ACTS

The Securities Act of 1933 4 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193446 contain provisions similar to those found in FELA. Both acts
41. Any seamen who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of
personal injury to railway employees shall apply.
46 U.S.C. sec. 688 (1988). The reference to the statutes modifying the common law
rights of railway workers incorporates FELA.
42. Kerman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
43. The Jones Act states that "Jurisdiction [shall reside in U.S. courts] of the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principle office is
located." 46 U.S.C. sec. 688(a) (1988). Although the statute uses the term "jurisdiction," it has been interpreted to mean "venue." Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S.
375, 385 (1924).
44. Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947)(noting that forum non
conviens is not available to defeat plaintiffs choice of forum under specific venue statutes);
cf Timothy P. O'Shea, Comment, The Jones Acts Specific Venue Provision: Does it
Preclude Forum Non Conviens Dismissal?, 14 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 696 (1990-91).
45. 15 U.S.C. sec. 77a (1988).
46. 15 U.S.C. sec. 78a (1988).
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have sections declaring as void any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to waive compliance with the act. 47 Each
Act also has a wide venue provision. 4 Like FELA and the Jones
Act, the Securities Acts were passed to prevent unfair business
practices .49
The initial interpretations of the Securities Acts would appear to
provide a basis for refusing to enforce forum selection clauses. In
Wilko v. Swan,50 the Supreme Court interpreted the prohibition
against any waiver of compliance in the 1933 Act. The Wilko Court
was faced with the issue of whether an arbitration clause violated the
waiver prohibition.5 The case was complicated by another statute,

47. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the
Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. sec. 77n (1988). Section 29(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange shall be void." 15 U.S.C. sec.
78cc(a) (1988).
Courts have concluded that these similar statutes are to be given substantially
the same effect. See Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, 451 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1971); Special
Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 1971). However, the
Supreme Court noted in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), that
while both sections prohibit agreements binding any person to waive compliance,
certain provisions in the 1933 Act have no comparable provision in the 1934 Act. Id.
at 514. This suggests both provisions may not have exactly the same application. See
generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Constructionand Application of Section
14 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.S. sec. 77n) andsection 29 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.S. sec. 78cc(a), Voiding Waiver of Compliance
With Statutory Provisionsor Rules or Regulations, 26 A.L.R. FED. 495 sec. 3 (1976).
48. The Securities Act of 1933 provides that "[any such suit or action may be
brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, or in the district where the sale took place, if the defendant participated
therein . . . ." 15 U.S.C. sec. 77v (1933). The Security Exchange Act of 1934 provides
that "[a]ny suit . . . may be brought . . . in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business . . . ." 15 U.S.C. sec. 78(a)(a) (1934).
49. Congress passed The Securities Act of 1933 to protect investors from
unscrupulous securities sellers. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953)(citing S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)). Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. S.E.C., 100
F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1939)("The manifest purpose of the Act is to protect the
public against imposition and fraud in the sale of securities through the use of the
mails or the facilities of interstate commerce.").
50. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
51. The Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519
(1974), described an arbitration clause as a specialized style of forum selection clause.
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the Federal Arbitration Act.52 Thus, the Wilko Court was forced to
balance conflicting statutory public policies. The Court held "the
intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried
out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues
arising under the act." 53 The Wilko Court reasoned that the arbitration
clause limited the plaintiff's choice of forum, and that the limitation
was a "waiver" of the statutory protection of the Act and consequently was void.54 The Court reached this decision despite the
countervailing policy consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act."
The Wilko Court noted that its decision was in accord with the
FELA decision in Boyd.56 The Court, however, did not go so far as
right.57
to interpret the Securities Act venue provision as a substantial
Like Boyd, the Wilko decision rested on the presumed congressional
intent to prevent parties from contracting away the protection granted
under the statutes.
58
The Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. limited the holding
of Wilko in several ways. First, it distinguished the 1933 Securities
Act at issue in Wilko from the 1934 Securities Exchange Act at issue
in Scherk.5 9 The Court noted that although both Acts have almost
identical waiver provisions, only the 1933 Act contains the broad
0
forum choices that Wilko said could not be waived.6 Second, the
Wilko reasoning rested on the Congressional creation of "special
61
rights" of private remedy in the 1933 Act. The Scherk Court did
not find these special rights present in the 1934 Act; it found only
judicially implied rights. 62 Lastly, the Court placed heavy emphasis
63
on the international context of the Scherk agreement. Like The
52. 9 U.S.C. secs. 1-14 (1982). Like forum selection clauses, the courts were
also openly hostile to arbitration clauses. Congress passed the Federal Arbitration
Act to express a strong public policy to enforce arbitration agreements. Weissbuch
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 1977).
53. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
54. Id. at 437-38.
55. For a complete analysis of the interrelation of the Federal Arbitration Act
and Securities Agreements, see C. Edward Fletcher III, PrivatizingSecurities Disputes
Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393 (1987).
56. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437.
57. Id. at 438.
58. 417 U.S. 506 (1974)(action to enforce arbitration clause in international
agreement).
59. See supra note 47.
60. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
61. Id. at 513, 514; see also Fletcher, supra note 55, at 410.
62. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
63. The Court described the international context of the Scherk case and then
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Bremen, the Court in Scherk relied on the needs of certainty and
predictability essential to international business. While limited by
Scherk, the Wilko decision was not overturned and remains valid law.
The Wilko decision, in light of the acknowledgement of its
similarity to Boyd,6 seems to provide a basis for refusing to enforce
forum selection clauses in Securities Acts cases. Both FELA and the
Securities Acts have wide venue statutes and anti-waiver provisions.
In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that despite the countervailing considerations of the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration
agreements sometimes violate the Securities Acts. 65
Courts, however, have not been receptive to applying the Wilko!
Boyd reasoning to strike down forum selection clauses. For example,
the plaintiffs in Adelson v. World Transportation6 attempted to make
a Boyd!Wilko argument to escape a forum selection clause in a
securities agreement. The plaintiffs argued that the forum selection
clause forced them to waive the liberal venue provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. 67 The court distinguished the arbitration agreement at
issue in Wilko from the forum selection clause in Adelson. The basis
of the distinction was that an arbitration agreement sacrifices the
judicial forum altogether, while a forum selection clause merely
chooses one specific forum. 6 Adelson construed the Wilko decision
as objecting to the pre-selection of a non-judicial forum because it
would sacrifice the effectiveness of the Act. 69 The court reasoned that
while arbitration decreases the effectiveness of the securities laws
under Wilko, a forum selection clause does not. In support of this,
the court stated that a forum selection clause, unlike an arbitration
clause, does not force "the buyer... [to] .. .give up any substantial

right, because there is no reason to assume that a full and fair
proceeding will not be provided in the New York forum." ' 70
Similarly, the court in Freidman v. World Transportation,Inc. ,71
refused to acknowledge the Boyd/Wilko exception to the enforcement
explained "[a] contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is ...an almost indispensable precondition
to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction." Id. at 516.
64. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953)(acknowledging that the decision
is in accord with Boyd).
65. Id. at 438.
66. 631 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 507.
Id.
Id.
Id.

71. 636 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
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of forum selection clauses in securities agreements. As in Adelson,
the Freidman court held that the plaintiff had not contracted away a
right to a judicial forum, but merely the right to 7a2 specific forum.
Thus, he did not waive compliance with the Act. The court also
noted that both Scherk and The Bremen indicated strong judicial
support for forum selection clauses, and that both Boyd and Wilko
were decided before forum selection clauses were generally enforceable. 73 Lastly, the court explained that Boyd was the result of a great
disparity in bargaining position between employers and employees
test the forum
and that even under The Bremen "reasonableness"
74
Boyd.
in
unenforceable
be
would
selection clause
The reasoning supporting the refusal to extend the holdings of
Boyd and Wilko can be attacked on several grounds. First, while the
Boyd decision was decided before forum selection clauses became
generally enforceable, it was specifically cited in The Bremen as an
example of a public policy rendering a forum selection clause unenforceable. 75 Second, while there is strong judicial support for the
enforcement of forum selection clauses, Wilko held the use of arbitration clauses to be void under the Securities acts despite the express
76
congressional policy favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses. In
addition, the Freidman court misconstrued Boyd as a mere application
of the reasonableness standard. Boyd was cited in The Bremen as an
example of an exception to the reasonableness standard. The Bremen
cited Boyd for the proposition that where congress has articulated a
strong remedial public policy, private individuals should not be allowed to undercut that policy's effectiveness by contractually limiting
the statute's enforcement.
C. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
In the last section, this article examined challenges to the enforceability of forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements. in light
of the specific venue and anti-waiver provisions in the securities laws.
This section deals with the specific statutory policy favoring arbitration agreements and the effect of this statutory expression of public
policy on the enforceability of forum selection clauses.
72. Id. at 692.
73. Id..

74. Id.

75. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
76. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),7 7 makes enforceable all
arbitration agreements concerning interstate commerce transactions. 78
Agreements concerning securities constitute transactions relating to
interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA. 79 Where a party is a
member of a group or stock exchange, the rules of the organization
have contractual validity for its members.80 Consequently, where those
rules provide for arbitration, the arbitration provision is a contract
between all the members." No express agreement to arbitrate is
necessary in the particular contract.82
Where an organization's rules incorporate into a contract the
right to arbitrate disputes, and the contract also contains a forum
selection clause, the contract has conflicting terms. A court must
weigh the statutory preference for enforcing arbitration agreements
under the FAA against the judicial policy favoring the enforcement
of forum selection clauses. The FAA creates a body of substantive
law and establishes that any doubts concerning the enforceability of
an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 3
However, parties can waive the right to call for arbitration. 4 The
issue thus is framed as whether a forum selection clause in a contract
waives the incorporated provision providing for arbitration.
This issue was squarely presented in Patten Securities v. Diamond
Greyhound and Genetics5 and Gelderman v. Stathis.8 6
Patten involved an agreement between a securities issuer and a securities dealer which contained a forum selection clause. The dealer was
77. 9 U.s.c. sec. 2 (1982) provides: "A written provision in any maritime

transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by

arbitration a controversy ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
78. Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).

79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id.; see also Cullen v. Pain, 587 F. Supp. 1520, 1523 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(Constitution and rules of New York Stock Exchange create a binding agreement to
arbitrate disputes against members); Gelderman, Inc. v. Stathis, 532 N.E.2d 366, 368
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988)(right to request arbitration in Chicago Board Options Exchange
Rules creates contract between members).
82. Cullen, 587 F. Supp. at 1523.

83. Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983)(showing the broad construction to be given the FAA).
84. Howard Hill Inc. v. George Fullin Co., 473 F.2d 217, 218 (5th Cir.
1973)(While parties may waive contractual arbitration agreement, what constitutes a

waiver must be determined on a case by case basis.).
85. 819 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1987).
86. 532 N.E.2d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
As a member of NASD, the dealer had agreed that public customers
7
could compel arbitration of eligible disputes.1 Because the agreement
involved inter-state commerce, the FAA governed the arbitration
agreementA"

The Patten court held that the forum selection clause did not
89
waive the incorporated arbitration provision. The court noted the
strong public policy articulated in the FAA and explained that doubts
concerning whether a dispute is arbitrable should be resolved in favor
of arbitration. 90 In contrast, "a forum selection clause .

.

. does not

enjoy such federal favor" and should not be enforced 'if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which
the suit is brought.' ' 92 The court reasoned that because the forum
selection clause made no reference to waiving arbitration, it was
ambiguous, and thus the strong policy favoring arbitration agreements
9'

controlled .9

The Patten court also noted that the forum selection clause could
still be given effect. After arbitration is completed, the forum selection94
clause could dictate the venue of an action to enforce the award.
Thus, the provisions could be given a non-conflicting interpretation.
The court in Gelderman Inc. v. Stathis95 relied on Patten in its
decision to enforce the incorporated arbitration provision over the
contractual forum selection clause. The agreement in dispute provided
for both parties to "comply with all the [Chicago Board Option]
9
Exchange Rules, and applicable state and federal law." The Chicago
Board Option Exchange Rules provided for the arbitration of disputes.
The agreement also provided for exclusive venue in "any state of [sic]
Federal Court of competent jurisdiction situated in Cook County
Illinois." ' 97 Relying on Patten, the court held that because the forum
selection clause made no reference to arbitration, it was ambiguous
87. Patten, 819 F.2d at 406 (Issuer is a public customer and can compel
arbitration under NASD rules which are contractually binding on dealer.).
88. Id.

89. Id.

90. Id. at 407.
91. Id.

92. Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
93. Patten, 819 F.2d at 407.
94. Id.

95. 532 N.E.2d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
96. Id. at 367.
97. Id.
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as a device to waive arbitration. 9 The court noted the FAA manifests
a strong public policy favoring arbitration, while a forum selection
clause "is unenforceable where enforcement would contravene a
strong public policy. '" 99 Thus, the strong statutory expression of public
policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements took precedence over the judicial policy favoring the enforcement of forum
selection clauses. In addition, the incorporated arbitration provision
took precedence over the contractual forum selection clause.
D.

THE MILLER ACT: THE RESTRICTIVE VENUE FRAMEWORK

Unlike the previous statutes analyzed, the conflict between the
Miller Act'0 and forum selection clauses rests only on the special
nature of the venue provision. The Miller Act forces general contractors working on public works projects for the United States to provide
a payment bond for the protection of subcontractors supplying labor
and materials. 10' Where a general contractor defaults on the subcontract, the Miller Act grants a cause of action to the subcontractor in
the name of the United States to sue on the bond. 10 2 The provisions
of the Miller Act are liberally construed in order to effectuate Congressional intent to protect subcontractors. 03
1
The Miller Act provides for venue only in the district court where
the contract was to be performed "and not elsewhere."' 4 Unlike
FELA, there is no prohibition on devices designed to limit liability.
However, the restrictive venue provision has been held to render
contractual forum designations, other than those provided by the Act,
to be void as contrary to congressional intent. 105
In United States ex rel. v. Roscoe-Ajax Construction Co.,1' 6 a
subcontractor brought a Miller Act claim in the proper district court.
98. Id. at 369.
99. Id. (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949); The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
100. 40 U.S.C. secs. 270a-270d (1988).
101. Id. sec. 270a(a)(2).
102. Id. sec. 270b(b).
103. See, e.g., United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 533 F.2d 469,
473 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 480 F.2d 1095, 1100
(8th Cir. 1973).
104. "Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the name of
the United States for the use of the person suing, in the United States District Court
for any district in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not
elsewhere..." 40 U.S.C. sec. 270b(b)(emphasis added).
105. United States ex rel. Vermont Marble Co. v. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., 246
F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
106. Id.
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The general contractor moved to transfer the action pursuant to a
forum selection clause contained in the applicable contract. The court
acknowledged the growth of a line of cases construing forum selection
clauses as generally enforceable. 1 7 The court, however, determined

that it need not decide whether the clauses were enforceable generally
because here the clauses violated the express provisions of the Miller
08

Act.1
The Roscoe-Ajax court recognized that the statute does not
merely place permissible9 venue, "it contains the unequivocable phrase
'and not elsewhere.""10 The court reasoned that the statute's legislative history, 110 as well as the judicial interpretations of the statute "all
indicate that the proviso 'and not elsewhere' embodies a different and
stronger public policy than normally inheres in the usual statutory
venue privilege created for the benefit of the defendant.""' In conclusion, the court characterized the venue provision as a non-waivable,
jurisdictional requirement." 2
Courts have also denied enforcement of forum selection clauses
3
in Miller Act cases where the designation was for a state court." In
a state court action, the Miller Act would not apply and the cause of
action must proceed on a common law basis. Courts have refused
enforcing forum selection clauses where the contractual forum is a
state court because the subcontractor would be denied the Miller Act
protections."14
107. This case was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in The Bremen,
at a time when the circuits were split as to the enforceability of forum selection
clauses.
108. Roscoe-Ajax Co., 246 F. Supp. at 442.
109. Id. (quoting 40 U.S.C. sec. 270 b(b)).
110. In a footnote, the court noted that one of the primary objectives of the
draftsman of the Miller Act was to assure venue in the district in which the action
was brought. This prevents harassing venue choices by the parties and facilitates
access to evidence. Id. at 442 n.3.
11. Id. at 442-43.
112. Id. at 443; see also United States v. William R. Austin Constr. Co., 436
F. Supp. 626 (W.D. Okla. 1977)(exemplifying a case decided after The Bremen
construing the Miller Act venue provision as an expression of the intent of Congress
as to venue and jurisdiction). But see F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 125 (1974)(describing 270(b) as merely venue requirement in dicta).
113. Gigliello v. Sovereign Constr. Co., 311 F. Supp. 371 (D. Mass. 1970); Ray
Gains, Inc. v. Essential Constr. Co., 261 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1966); United States
ex rel. M.G.M. Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 38 F.R.D. 418 (N.D. Cal.
1965).
114. Ray Gains, 261 F. Supp. at 720 (action based on common law would not
include right to join surety granted under Miller Act).
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More recent decisions have held forum selection clauses valid
despite the restrictive statutory venue provision." 5 These decisions
disregarded the public policy underlying the Miller Act's venue provision and simply construed the venue provisions as a waivable right. 116
These courts then mechanically applied the reasonableness test and
enforced the forum selection clause without reference to the statutory
public policy exception recognized in The Bremen. This mechanical
application disregards both the more formal analysis of The Bremen
and the earlier interpretations of the Miller Act venue provision.
E.

THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT

The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act"' (COGSA) provides a
microcosm of the variety in analysis and result that has plagued the
relationship between forum selection clauses and particular statutes.
This section analyzes the enforceability of forum selection clauses
under COGSA both before and after their general acceptance in The
Bremen. Part V examines the continuing validity of the COGSA
holdings in light of the recent Supreme Court case Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute."8
In maritime contracts, cargo is carried under Bills of Lading." 9
A Bill of Lading is both an acknowledgement that a carrier has
received goods and a contract of carriage.120 COGSA regulates the
terms of Bills of Lading. COGSA may apply by the statute's own
terms or be incorporated by reference into a contract.' 21

115. See, e.g., John's Insulation v. Siska Constr. Co., 671 F. Supp. 289

(S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979); United

States ex rel. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Frank Briscoe Co., 462 F. Supp. 114 (E.D.
La. 1978).
116. John's Insulation, 671 F. Supp. at 293 (holding that Miller Act does not
apply to suit by general contractor against subcontractors, but even if Miller Act did
apply, Miller Act venue provision can be altered by contract, thus forum selection
clause is enforceable); In re Fireman's Fund, 588 F.2d at 95. ("While the phrase
'and not elsewhere' would initially appear to foreclose further discussion, it must be
remembered that this subsection is not jurisdiction but only a venue provision ...
[which can be] varied by contract . .

").

117. 46 U.S.C. secs. 1300-15 (1926).
118. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).

119. Justin L. Williams, Forum Selection Clauses: Where They Are - Where
They Are Going, 6 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1983).

120. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW
93 (2d ed. 1975).
121. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 116, at 3-25.

OF ADMIRALTY, sec.

3-1, at
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COGSA governs the rights and responsibilities between parties
with respect to the goods covered by the Bill of Lading. 22 COGSA
allows parties to contract to increase the shipowner's liabilities, but
not decrease them. 23 The statute also has a prohibition against limiting
liability. 24 Courts construing the effect of a forum selection clause in
against limiting liability have reached
relation to the prohibition
1 21
conclusions.
different
Before the general acceptance of forum selection clauses in The

Bremen, some courts enforced forum selection clauses in Bills of
Lading despite the prohibition against limiting liability in COGSA.
For example, in Aetna Insurance Co. v. The Satrustegui,126 the court
enforced a forum selection clause stipulating that suit be brought in
Spain despite the COGSA prohibition against limiting liability. The
court construed the forum selection clause as neither lessening nor
relieving liability, and enforced the clause. 27
Similarly, William H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line

Ltd. 2 also held that a forum selection clause did not violate the

COGSA. The Muller court observed that unlike FELA, COGSA did
not grant jurisdiction to any particular court, nor did it contain a
30
broad venue provision. 29 Thus, the Boyd analysis did not apply. In
litigating in a
addition, the court found that the increased expense of
13
'
COGSA.
under
liability
lessen
not
did
forum
foreign
The Second Circuit overruled Muller in Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg.'3 2 The court stated that "the Muller court leaned too heavily
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection
with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and
obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than
as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. sec. 1303(8) (1982).
125. See generally C. Andrea Waters, The Enforceability of Forum Selection
Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: An Update, 15 TUL. MAR.L.J. 29 (1991)(giving
circuit by circuit breakdown of the effect on enforceability of forum selection clauses
and noting different application in some circuits depending on whether COGSA
applied by its own terms or was incorporated into an agreement by reference).
126. 171 F. Supp. 33 (D. P.R. 1959).
127. Id. at 34.
128. 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
129. Id. at 807.
130. Id.
131. The forum selection clause at issue in Muller provided for exclusive
jurisdiction in Swedish courts. Id. at 807.
132. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
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on general principles of contract law" and did not give enough
emphasis to the COGSA provision. 33 The court noted that foreign
fora would limit liability where the claim was small because the
increased cost would prevent the plaintiff from pursuing her claim. 34

Moreover, the foreign forum may not apply COGSA or apply it in a
different way than a domestic forum, thus limiting liability. 13 The
decision rested upon the presumed congressional intent underlying

COGSA to regulate common carriers.
Recent decisions all refuse to enforce forum selection clauses
providing for foreign fora where COGSA applies. For instance, the
Fourth Circuit struck down a forum selection clause specifying a
foreign forum in Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd. v. S.S.

Elikon. 36 In noting the conflicting policy considerations between The
Bremen and COGSA, the court stated "the general policy here

[Bremen policy of enforcing forum selection clauses] must recede

before the specific policy enunciated by Congress through COGSA."'' 37
The court noted that COGSA's prohibition against limiting liability

was intended to prevent these one-sided bargains.'
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit also recently refused to enforce a

forum selection clause in Conklin Garret Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose.3 9

The Conklin court also based its decision on presumed congressional
intent to regulate common carriers.' 4° The Court recognized that:
COGSA allows a freedom of contracting out of its terms, but
only in the direction of increasing the shipowner's liability,
133. Id. at 202, 203.
134. Id. at 203.
135. Id. at 203, 204. One decision in the First Circuit has continued to enforce
forum selection clauses in Bills of Lading where the contractual forum was domestic.
Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d. 1294, 1296
(1st Cir. 1974). The court noted that the concerns of lessening liability because of
difference in construction and application in COGSA are not present when the
contractual forum is domestic. Id. Thus, the court could enforce a forum selection
clause designating a domestic forum. Id. at 1296.
136. 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981). See generally Rose M. Deggendorf, Recent
Case, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 183 (1982).
137. Union Ins. Soc. of Canton Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 725 (4th Cir.
1981).
138. Id. at 724.
139. Conklin Garret Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987)(merrygo-round damaged in shipment between the United Kingdom and Florida). See
generally John C. Fraser, Recent Case, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 411 (1988-89).
140. Conklin, 826 F.2d at 1443 (citing with approval Union Ins. Soc. of Canton
Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981)).
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and never in the direction of diminishing them. This apparent
one sidedness is a common sense recognition of the inequality
in bargaining power ... [which COGSA was] designed to
14 1
redress.
Thus, the court reasoned that preservation of the remedial purpose of COGSA required striking down the forum selection clause.
The COGSA decisions rest on preserving the remedial nature of
the statute. Like the other statutes examined, the COGSA decisions
recognize the uneven bargaining position of the parties. Therefore,
courts enforce the specific policy consideration in COGSA over the
general preference for forum selection clauses articulated in The
Bremen. Courts give great weight to the presumed congressional intent
to regulate common carriers reflected in COGSA's prohibition against
limiting liability. Even without the express wide venue choices present
in other statutes, courts strike down forum selection clauses as a
limitation of liability.

IV.

THE SHUTE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT MUDDIES UP THE
INTERNATIONAL WATERS

It is questionable whether COGSA type rulings which consider

forum selection clauses to be a limitation of liability continue to have
validity. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the
enforceability of forum selection clauses came in Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute.1 42 Ms. Shute purchased a cruise ticket from a
Florida based cruise line which contained a boilerplate forum selection
clause designating courts in Florida as the exclusive fora.143 The tickets
were purchased through a travel agent, through the mail, and were
non-refundable. 44 The Court first found the clause reasonable under
141. Id. at 1443. (citing GRANT GLMORE & CHARLEs BLACK, THE LAW OF
145-47 (2d ed. 1975).
142. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991)(The Supreme
Court sitting in admiralty declined to rule on the personal jurisdiction issue raised,
finding the forum selection clause dispositive of the case.).
143. See id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1524. One question the Court addressed was the effect of the lack
of bargaining over the provision. The Bremen enforced a forum selection clause
bargained for provision between sophisticated parties in an international context. The
unequal bargaining power and lack of negotiation would appear to make the clause
unreasonable under The Bremen standard. However, the Court determined that it is
not reasonable for negotiations to take place in the context of a passage agreement
and not necessary that the parties have equal bargaining power. Id. at 1527.
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The Bremen standard. 45 The Court then looked to see whether the
provision violated a statute regulating carrier ticketing provisions.
The Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability Act 183c'4 makes any
rule, regulation, contract or agreement attempting to limit a carrier's
liability for negligence void as a matter of public policy. 47 The Court
in Shute strictly interpreted the statute to avoid any conflict with the
forum selection clause. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
noted that the forum selection clause did not "take away respondents'
right to 'a trial by [a] court of competent jurisdiction." ' ' 4 The
majority reasoned that since the contractual forum was Florida, the
forum selection clause did not violate the statute. 49 In addition, the

Court cited legislative history5 o to suggest that the Congressional
purpose behind the statute was to prevent arbitration clauses from

removing negligence actions from courts altogether.'' According to
the majority, nothing supported the view that Congress intended the

145. Id. The Court found the boilerplate forum selection clause valid under the
"refined" reasonableness standard. The Court noted that the cruise line "ha[d] a
special interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit"
because "it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line to
litigation in several different fora." Id. at 1527. In addition, the clause is reasonable
because the passengers benefited from reduced fairs and because it conserves judicial
resources. Id. Thus, the court greatly expanded the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in admiralty cases. Whether this expanded definition of reasonableness will
be applied outside admiralty remains to be seen.
146. 46 U.S.C. app. sec. 183c (1936).
147. The statute reads:
It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any vessel
transporting passengers between ports of the United States or between any
such port and a foreign port to insert any rule, regulation, contract, or
agreement any provision or limitation (1) purporting, in the event of loss of
life or bodily injury arising from the negligence or fault of such owner of
his servants, to relieve such owner, master, or agent from liability beyond
any stipulated amount, for such loss or injury, or (2) purporting in such
event to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by
court of competent jurisdiction on the question of liability for such loss or
injury, or the measure of damages therefor. All such provisions or limitations
contained in any such rule, regulation, contract, or agreement are declared
to be against public policy and shall be null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. app. sec. 183(c) (1936).
148. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991).
149. Id. at 1529.
150. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 2061, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936); H.R. REP. No.
2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936)).
151. Id.
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having a plaintiff travel to a distant forum in order
statute to "avoid
15 2
to litigate.''
Justice Stevens in dissent, however, pointed to the exact same
legislative history to find that Congress intended "to put a stop to all
such practices and practices of a like character."' 53 The dissent gave
a broader reading to section 183(c) based on this legislative history.
The dissent noted that the absence of any express mention of forum
selection clauses is "explained by the fact that such clauses were
already unenforceable under common law and would not often be
used by carriers, which were relying on stipulation that purported to
exonerate them . . . entirely."'15 4 The dissent also reasoned that denying the enforcement of the forum selection clause would be in
accord with the decisions striking down forum selection clauses where
COGSA applied.'
The majority ruling that a forum selection clause did not lessen
a party's right to trial casts some doubt on the continuing validity of
other statutory restrictions on the enforceability of forum selection
clauses. This is particularly true because the wording in 183c is almost
identical to COGSA. 5 6 The majority reasoning also shows a general
willingness to strictly construe a statute in order to enforce a forum
selection clause.
While it is too early to toll the death knell of the statutory public
policy exception noted in The Bremen, Shute may be the beginning
of the end. Enforcing a forum selection clause that appeared in
boilerplate language in the back of a non-refundable passenger ticket,
where there was no bargaining over the provision, despite a statutory
restriction on lessening liability, shows the Supreme Court is sympathetic to the needs of business to limit the fora in which they can be
sued.
V.

THE DISMANTLING OF THE

Boyd

FRAMEWORK

The Boyd framework may no longer provide a basis for striking
down forum selection clauses. The Boyd decision rested on twin
planks of a prohibition against any device designed to limit liability

and a wide venue provision construed as a substantive right.'

Both

152. Id.
153. Id. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936)).
154. Id. at 4328 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1532-33.
156. Compare 46 U.S.C. sec. 1303(8) (1988) with 46 U.S.C. sec. 183c (1936).
157. See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
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these planks were given broad effect based on the remedial purpose
of FELA and legislative history."' The Bremen, in declaring forum
selection clauses prima-facie valid, provided an exception where
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy such as that
evidenced in Boyd.
In applying the statutory public policy exception,
courts have
reached different results. Courts have enforced forum selection clauses
despite the existence of a broad venue provision and prohibition
against any limitation in liability in the Securities Act cases. 19 However, in COGSA cases, courts have refused to enforce forum selection
clauses that contain only a provision against limiting liabilities and
no special venue statute.1 60 In Miller Act cases, courts have refused
to enforce forum selection clauses relying only on a restrictive venue

provision. 16!

Both the venue and the prohibition against limiting liability
rationales for refusing to enforce forum selection clauses have been
eroded. The Shute holding that forum selection clauses do not lessen
or avoid liability weakens the COGSA type reasoning.162 While commentators and lower courts have unanimously held that forum selection clauses should not be enforced under COGSA, the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to apply a COGSA-type ruling and declined. Whether lower courts will restrict the Shute holding to 183c
cases remains to be seen. There seems to be no argument, however,
that a stronger public policy inheres in a statute to protect cargo
than to protect passengers from negligence.
The Shute decision also represents an extension of The Bremen
concerns of protecting business interests. Both Shute and The Bremen
show the Supreme Court is sympathetic to the desires of businesses
to limit the fora in which they can be sued. While The Bremen
holding was limited to international businesses engaged in cross
oceanic towage, Shute shows that the Court will extend the same
protection to businesses dealing with individuals. More importantly,
Shute represents a subjugation of the remedial protection of a statute
to predictability in business affairs. Thus, The Bremen public policy
of catering to the needs of business has become the overriding concern
of the Court.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

31-40 and accompanying text.
45-76 and accompanying text.
117-141 and accompanying text.
100-116 and accompanying text.
142-155 and accompanying text.
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The second rationale of the Boyd
venue provision, has also eroded. 163 The
provisions such as FELA was reiterated
on the Kepner definition of the FELA

framework, the expansive
Boyd view of special venue
in Gulf Oil.' 64 Boyd relied
venue provision. 165 Kepner

defined the special venue provision as a privilege that could not be
defeated by convenience or expense. 66 Both Boyd and Gulf Oil noted67

that special venue provisions create non-waivable substantial rights.1
Congress, however, apparently did not agree with this expansive

interpretation of the special venue provision in Kepner. When Congress enacted the 1404 transfer provision, 68 it specifically cited Kepner
69

in the reviser's notes as an example of the need for the provision.
While no cases have expressly inquired into the effect that this note
has on the enforceability of forum selection clauses, the implication
is that the special venue provisions can be defeated.7 0 Thus, there is
some indication that cases may be transferred pursuant to a forum
selection clause even where a cause of action is brought under a
specific venue provision.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR ENFORCING A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE
WHERE THERE IS AN APPLICABLE STATUTE

Enforcing forum selection clauses where there is an applicable
statute involves giving effect to conflicting policies. On one side is
163. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
164. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).

165. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 35.
167. See supra notes 35 and 44 and accompanying text.
168. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1404(a) (1948). The transfer provision was adopted as part
of the Judicial Code of 1948 and provides that "[ffor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district court or division where it might have been brought." Id. Prior to
the enactment of the transfer provision a federal court could dismiss a case under
the common law doctrine of forum non conviens, but could not transfer the suit to

a more convenient forum. See generally 15
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE sec. 3841 (1986).

CHARLES

A.

WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL

169. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1404(a) (1948) (revision notes).
170. Kepner did not involve a forum selection clause. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text; cf. Gazio v. John S. Latsis, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (discussing the Kepner analysis of specific venue statutes, the revision note,
and the possible effect of defeating specific venue of Jones Act with a motion for
forum non conviens); see also supra note 41-44 and accompanying text (describing
the relationship of FELA and Jones Act). But see Zipfel v. Halliburtion Co., 832
F.2d 1477, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987) (following Kepner and holding that the Jones Act
specific venue provision banned a forum non conviens dismissal); compare Timothy
P. O'Shea, The Jones Act Venue Provision:Does It Preclude Forum Non Conviens
Dismissal?, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 696 (1990-1991).
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The Bremen policy of providing orderliness and predictability in
business dealings, and on the other is the statutory policy designed
to protect individuals unable to protect themselves. This section will
examine two ways to balance these competing objectives under the
1404 transfer statute.
Enforcing forum selection clauses where the action is brought in
a non-contractual forum, and the contractual forum is another
federal court, is governed by 1404.171 The Supreme Court in Stewart
Organization v. Ricoh7 2 expressly dealt with the relationship between
motions to transfer under 1404 and forum selection clauses. Stewart
held that a forum selection clause is not dispositive of a motion to
transfer under 1404.111 Instead, a court has discretion to "balance a
number of case specific factors" such as the "fairness of transfer in
light of the forum selection clause and the parties' relative bargaining
power."14
The Stewart model for enforcing forum selection clauses allows
two possible models for extending the statutory public policy exceptions previously discussed. The models balance the competing policy
concerns of The Bremen, and the particular statute. The effect of
each model is to place the burden of justifying, the transfer on the
weaker policy consideration.
The first model entails the district court using the statute as
criteria weighing in favor of a party being protected in a 1404 transfer
analysis. Where a party is a member of a protected class given a
specific right of recovery (such as injured railroad workers, injured
seamen, subcontractors, securities buyers, cruise passengers) the court
should use this as a relevant factor favoring the plaintiff's choice of
forum. Under this model, the burden would remain on the plaintiff
171. Where the contractual forum is a state forum or a foreign forum, transfer
is impossible and a forum non conviens analysis is required to enforce the forum
selection clause. See generally 15 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

sec. 3828 (1976).
172. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The case arose from a dealership agreement containing
a forum selection clause. The case was in federal court under diversity jurisdiction
and determined what effect state policy has on the enforcement of a forum selection
clause where there is a motion to transfer. The federal court was sitting in Alabama
which does not enforce forum selection clauses as a matter of policy. The court held
that 1404 governs a motion to transfer and in that area federal law is supreme. Id.
at 31.
173. Id. at 31 ("The forum selection clause, which represents the parties'
agreement as to the most proper forum, should receive neither dispositive consideration ... nor no consideration ... but rather the consideration for which Congress
provided in section 1404(a).").
174. Id. at 29.
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seeking to avoid the forum selection clause. However, his special
status as a protected class would provide a greater chance of defeating
the forum selection clause. Thus, the protected party could combine
other case specific factors such as availability of witnesses, sources
of proof and convenience of the parties, with the weight given to his
statutory protection.
Alternatively, in the second model, the district court could strike
down the forum selection clause as violating public policy, thus
shifting the burden to the defendant. Under this model the defendant
could still seek a motion to transfer under 1404, however, he must
show that the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice
weigh heavily enough to defeat the plaintiff's choice of forum. If
Congress wished to protect those without bargaining power from
contracting out of the statutes protections, this approach carries out
congressional intent.
CONCLUSION

In order to provide international businesses with certainty and
predictability, The Bremen recognized forum selection clauses as
prima-facie valid. The Bremen Court, however, provided an exception
where enforcement of the clause would violate a policy articulated
by statute or judicial decision. Courts have refused to enforce forum
selection clauses where necessary to preserve the remedial nature of
a statute.
The trend is to enforce the forum selection clauses despite the
existence of a countervailing statutory provision. Both the special
venue statutes and the prohibition against limiting liability rationales
of the original Boyd framework have been eroded. First, courts now
often view the venue provision as a waivable right. Second, decisions
do not always recognize that a forum selection clause limits liability.
This judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses in the face of an
applicable statute allows employers and common carriers to use their
superior bargaining position to contract into litigation advantages.
The models presented balance the competing concerns of businesses and particular statutes under the discretion of district court
through the 1404 transfer provision. Courts could weigh the particular
policy concerns in specific situations, and place the burden on the
weaker policy concern. Where a statute embodies a strong remedial
policy designed to protect a class without bargaining power, the
proper approach would be to refuse to enforce the forum selection
clause, but allow the transfer where other 1404 factors weigh heavily
enough to defeat the plaintiff's choice of forum. In doing so, much
uncertainty and possible unfairness would be avoided.
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